Returnees in the Maghreb. A European perspective. Egmont Security Policy Brief No. 120 December 2019 by Renard, Thomas
  
   
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
No. [ ] 
[Date] 
No. 120 
December 2019 
Returnees in the Maghreb. A European perspective  
Thomas Renard 
More than 10,000 individuals travelled from 
Europe and North Africa to fight in Syria and 
Iraq. Now, Europe and North Africa are 
dealing with the challenge of returning 
foreign fighters, mostly separately. This 
policy brief looks at the inter-regional 
dimension of the returnees’ challenge, at why 
Europe should care more about North 
Africa’s ability (or not) to craft effective 
policies, and how it could help – with a focus 
on the European Union (EU). It concludes 
with concrete recommendations for the EU 
and North African countries. 
 
 
A CHALLENGE WITHOUT PRECEDENT  
Countries from North Africa have provided one 
of the largest contingents of foreign terrorist 
fighters (FTFs) to the Levant. More than 5,000 
individuals joined jihadi groups in Syria and Iraq 
since 2012, while about 2,000 went to Libya. 
Most of them originated from Tunisia, one of the 
countries worldwide with the highest ratio of 
FTFs per inhabitant (about 3000 went to 
Iraq/Syria, and about 1500 to Libya). Another 
significant contingent came from Morocco (1664 
went to the Levant and 300 to Libya, according 
to intelligence services), while the Egyptian 
contingent is estimated at 500-600. This 
mobilization is not only large in contemporary 
terms, compared to other regions, but also larger 
than any previous jihadi mobilization, including 
that for the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan in the 
1980s. 
 
FTFs have raised concern among North African 
countries. Returning foreign fighters in particular 
are considered a serious threat. Over the past few 
years, Egypt and Tunisia have both been struck 
by terrorist attacks either perpetrated by or 
involving returnees from Syria and Libya. 
Meanwhile, Morocco dismantled several terrorist 
networks involving returnees. Although not 
every returning fighter is a direct threat, ‘veteran 
jihadis’ can bring the jihad home, transfer their 
military skills to local recruits, or actively engage 
in proselytizing activities including from within 
prison. Some returnees from previous jihadi 
waves (Afghanistan, Iraq) played a critical role in 
the mobilization for the Syrian jihad. Overall, 
returnees are a long-term security liability. 
 
In a recent report published jointly by the Konrad-
Adenauer-Stiftung and the Egmont Institute, we 
looked specifically into this challenge and how 
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North African governments responded to it.1  It 
appears that all countries are aware of the 
challenge and have taken measures to deal with it. 
However, the scope of the challenge varies from 
one country to another, as well as the capacity to 
tackle it effectively. Tunisia would be dealing with 
about 1,000 returnees (representing about a third 
of its FTF contingent, similar to European 
ratios), while Morocco would only have just over 
200 returnees (about 12% of its FTF contingent). 
Figures for Egypt are unknown but most likely 
comprised between one hundred and several 
hundred. 
 
Morocco has developed a systematic policy to 
deal with returnees. It has strong and capable 
security services, as well as new laws facilitating 
the prosecution of returning fighters. In prison, a 
new rehabilitation programme has been initiated, 
which will also be open to returnees. In contrast, 
Tunisia and Egypt have taken a narrower and less 
systematic approach to dealing with returnees. 
Tunisian authorities and civil society seem to 
agree that the country is ill-equipped to deal with 
this challenge. Only a fraction of returning 
fighters was prosecuted and jailed, while most are 
said to be ‘under house arrest’ or ‘monitored’, if 
at all. In Egypt, there are simply very few specific 
instruments or laws for coping with returnees. In 
both Tunisia and Egypt, prisons lack specific 
rehabilitation and reinsertion programmes for 
returnees, while overcrowded detention facilities 
are at risk of breeding further radicalisation. 
 
Overall, North African countries share a heavily 
security-driven approach to terrorism and 
returning fighters. In spite of their rhetoric, they 
all fail to take a comprehensive approach, 
encompassing the rehabilitation and reintegration 
of returnees, while in prison and long afterwards. 
Little prevention (P/CVE) work is being 
developed, which implies that the underlying 
conducive environment to radicalisation and 
mobilization is still present locally. Returnees 
exiting prison are therefore likely to fall back in 
the same environment that led to their 
radicalisation in the first place, but also to play a 
role in the radicalisation of others. Furthermore, 
counter-terrorism policies are often criticized by 
international observers and organisations for 
their lack of compliance with international law 
and human rights standards, which is also 
counterproductive in the longer term. 
 
 
THE EUROPEAN CONNECTION 
The success or failure of North African countries 
to mitigate the threat from returnees over the 
long term will have clear effects on Europe’s 
security. First, there is, of course, geographic 
proximity. The development of jihadi networks 
or, worse, the strengthening of a jihadi front 
closer to Europe is a worrying perspective. Jihadi 
fighters in the Maghreb and Egypt could plot 
attacks against European interests in the region 
(diplomatic, business or tourists), but also plot or 
incite attacks on European soil.  
 
In spite of the fall of the Caliphate, there is the 
possibility of a jihadi resurgence in Syria, as well 
as in other regions such as Libya or the Sinai, with 
a possible influx of European and North African 
FTFs. The multiplication and internationalisation 
of jihadi conflicts makes it more complicated for 
European services to monitor their national 
fighters and protect their interests worldwide. 
 
Second, there are historical and personal ties 
between North Africa and diaspora communities 
in Europe. Such connections have existed 
between jihadis from North Africa and Europe 
for more than two decades. Historically, veteran 
fighters from the Maghreb have been active 
throughout Europe, to proselytize and recruit 
notably. Groups such as the Moroccan Islamic 
Combatant Group or the Tunisian Combatant 
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Group were partly rooted in Europe. However, 
the unprecedented number of FTFs from Europe 
and the Maghreb (about 10,000 combined) has 
created an unprecedented jihadi community 
across the region. 
 
Many European foreign fighters who joined the 
caliphate were of Moroccan or Tunisian descent, 
and they fought alongside North African fighters. 
Some were likely integrated in the same units. 
Several Europeans also travelled to and stayed in 
North Africa before heading to Syria. These ties 
have inevitably deepened in the Syrian context 
and will probably outlive the caliphate. The seeds 
of future terrorist networks spanning across the 
Mediterranean Sea have undoubtedly been 
planted already. 
 
Adding to this, a number of European countries 
have stripped terrorist convicts or suspects of 
their European citizenship and subsequently 
expelled them. This approach is one of the 
cornerstones of Italy’s counter-terrorism policy, 
which has expelled (with or without citizenship 
stripping) over 400 presumed ‘extremists’ since 
2014. The vast majority of these expulsions 
concerned Moroccans, Tunisians and Egyptians. 
Revoking citizenship (in the case of binationals) 
and /or the expulsion of foreign citizens with 
links to terrorist organisations are also considered 
or used with increased frequency throughout 
Europe. Germany passed a new law in 2019 
facilitating such measures, whereas the UK and 
Denmark have already stripped a number of 
violent extremists of their nationality, notably 
foreign fighters stranded in Syria. 
 
Removing highly influential individuals from the 
national territory is sometimes perceived as an 
effective way to counter radicalisation in the 
short term, but the longer terms effects of such 
policy are highly debatable. To be sure, it is an 
ethically dubious policy given that most 
European foreign fighters radicalised in Europe. 
Their case is therefore clearly Europe’s 
responsibility. Pretending otherwise only feeds 
into jihadi groups’ narrative on the discrimination 
and marginalisation of Muslims in Europe.  
 
Furthermore, such ‘offshoring’ approach increases 
the risk of creating a new jihadi ‘community of 
the unwanted’, which may further coalesce in 
prisons and socialise with local jihadi milieus. 
This community will not only hold deeper 
grievances against European authorities but also 
rely on extensive networks in Europe, among 
friends and family, while being mostly out of 
reach of European security services. Such 
approach also increases the security burden on 
North African countries, which are already facing 
a higher strain than Europe.    
 
We could add to this ‘community of unwanted’ 
the group of European fighters in Syria deprived 
of their nationality and of their right to return 
home; and who are probably ineligible for 
repatriation by North African states. These 
stranded fighters are more likely to become 
‘roaming fighters’, with few other alternatives to 
a life of jihad, and therefore remaining a long-
term threat worldwide. 
 
Overall, Europe and North Africa are both facing 
a tremendous and unprecedented challenge. 
While individual countries are responsible for 
crafting effective policies to deal with returning 
fighters, there are clear incentives to cooperate in 
light of the shared threat landscape. 
 
EU SUPPORT TO NORTH AFRICA 
The EU Council conclusions of 9 February 2015 
constitute one of the guiding documents for the 
EU’s external efforts in counter-terrorism. It 
states that the EU’s security depends on its 
engagement and outreach with neighbouring 
regions, particularly the Middle East and North 
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Africa (MENA), in light of the foreign fighters’ 
threat. In this respect, countries of the Maghreb 
are considered to be priority partners, and counter-
terrorism (CT) has become much more central to 
the EU’s cooperation with North African 
countries. 
 
The EU doubled its financial contribution on 
external counter-terrorism, reaching €274 million 
in 2015-17, more than 20% of which was 
allocated to the MENA region.2  CT Action Plans 
have been agreed with countries in the region 
(except Morocco, due to political tensions linked 
to the Western Sahara issue), while the EU has 
appointed CT experts in its delegations (except in 
Egypt, due to local reluctance). With Tunisia, 
there is even a High-Level political dialogue, with 
the participation of the EU Counter-Terrorism 
Coordinator, Gilles de Kerchove.  
 
The EU has supported a number of relevant 
initiatives at the regional level, notably in terms of 
training and capacity-building for regional police 
cooperation, or to encourage the use of Interpol 
instruments and databases. Europol is 
negotiating cooperation agreements with all 
countries of the Maghreb, except Libya. 
Furthermore, a pilot project supporting regional 
civil society actors in countering violent 
extremism (CVE) was also initiated.  
 
Tunisia is probably the country in the region that 
is the most open to cooperation with the EU. It 
has received significant support for the reform of 
its justice system or for its prisons, notably. The 
EU is also active in the G7+ support group for 
Tunisia (G7 countries + Belgium, Netherlands, 
Spain, Switzerland, EU and UNODC), where the 
EU co-chairs the working group on 
radicalisation. In contrast, Morocco and Egypt 
are less open to cooperation and assistance. They 
do not necessarily perceive the added value of the 
EU in these issues of national security. Of course, 
EU efforts do not occur in a vacuum. They 
complement other CT-related initiatives taken by 
its member states. 
 
Overall, the EU’s efforts in the region have 
increased, but they remain modest. And their 
effects are hard to measure. On the issue of 
returning foreign fighters specifically, the EU’s 
efforts are even more limited, in spite of the 2015 
Council conclusions identifying it as a priority. 
There is a recognition that more should be done, 
but this appears difficult in light of the reluctance 
from certain North African governments and of 
the lack of flexibility of EU financial 
instruments.3  More fundamentally, the EU has 
not been able so far to convince its North African 
partners to develop a more comprehensive 
approach to terrorism and foreign fighters, with 
the development of stronger socio-preventive 
policies. 
 
10 RECOMMENDATIONS 
In light of the returnees’ long-term challenge for 
the Maghreb and Europe, we formulate ten key 
recommendations. 
 
To the North African countries: 
 
• Develop a more systematic response to 
returnees. States should be able to detect returning 
fighters, prosecute, rehabilitate and monitor 
them. The United Nations’ Counter-Terrorism 
Committee (UN CTC) ‘Madrid Guiding 
Principles’ serve as a benchmark to meet. 
•  Work on the rehabilitation and reintegration 
of returnees, starting in prison. Incarceration 
may effectively ‘freeze’ the problem stemming 
from returnees for several years, but it will not 
help in the longer term if terrorist offenders are 
not supported in their desistance efforts. Some 
returnees are already exiting prisons in the 
Maghreb and Egypt, with little support. An 
effective approach to returnees should therefore 
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aim at lowering the chances of re-offending upon 
release by increasing the chances of a successful 
reinsertion. 
•   Tame the conducive environment to violent 
radicalisation. As foreign fighters return into 
society, most often into their former 
environment, the risk of them re-engaging in 
jihadi activities is high if the primary causes of 
their radicalisation are not addressed. So far, 
however, it is not clear how much effort has been 
invested in such prevention programmes; but it is 
clearly not enough.  
• Develop contacts with regional and 
international partners, in order to obtain as 
much information as possible on (detained) 
North African fighters. Biometric information, as 
well as evidence collected by the Iraqi authorities 
could be useful to feed national and international 
databases (i.e. Interpol, Europol), to gain better 
knowledge about these fighters’ role in the 
conflict and future intentions, as well as to hinder 
their movements and ease their prosecution. 
 
To the EU, we recommend the following 
measures towards the Maghreb and Egypt: 
 
• Encourage the development of more 
comprehensive strategies to deal with 
returning foreign fighters and violent 
extremism in general. Morocco and Tunisia are 
moving in the right direction, but should be 
further supported to develop stronger socio-
preventive programmes (P/CVE) as well as more 
cooperation among government services (multi-
agency approach). 
•    Increase the support for the security sector 
reform (SSR) in the Maghreb, with a particular 
focus on the justice and penitentiary administrations, 
emphasising the importance of complying with 
human rights standards. 
• Increase the support for development 
programmes that are not specifically CT-
oriented, but which can undermine the 
conducive environment to violent radicalisation 
by fostering economic development and social 
inclusion in areas particularly affected by 
radicalisation. 
• Increase the support for civil society 
organisations active in P/CVE efforts, 
particularly at the local level. 
•   Encourage the exchange of good practices 
between Europe and North Africa in dealing 
with returning foreign fighters and violent 
extremism. The EU-funded Radicalisation 
Awareness Network (RAN) has identified a 
number of good practices, which could serve as 
inspiration for the region. 
•  Support further exchanges and cooperation 
between relevant CT and P/CVE services in 
North Africa. The EU could support a regional 
RAN (separate from the EU RAN), bringing 
together practitioners from the region to develop 
their own good practices inspired from the local 
context. In short, a sort of ‘RAN made in MENA’. 
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